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The purpose of this paper is to examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for
negligence when expected accident costs depend both on the agent’s level of expertise
and the principal’s level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physi-
cian and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. Under
current law, physicians generally are considered independent contractors and hence
MCOs are not liable for negligent acts by physicians. We find that the practice of re-
viewing the medical decisions of physicians affects their incentives to take care, which,
in turn, implies that it is efficient for MCOs to be held liable for the torts committed by
their physicians.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the proper scope of physician and managed
care organization (MCO) negligence liability for medical malpractice. Specifically, we
determine how the exertion of control by the MCO over physician decision making
affects the optimal damage award when a tort is the result of either physician or MCO
negligence. It is shown that when the MCO is liable for all torts, including those
committed by its physicians, then the standard rule for damages results in an efficient
outcome. However, under current law MCOs generally are not liable for their own
negligent treatment decisions. MCOs also are not liable for the negligence of their
affiliated physicians because physicians affiliated with managed care plans generally
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are deemed to be independent contractors and thus only they are personally liable for
their torts. Our results imply that under current law patients are receiving suboptimal
levels of care.
In contrast with traditional fee-for-service insurers, MCOs are not simply passive
insurers whose role is limited to paying for any treatment provided. MCOs seek to
affect care directly through the use of a “utilization review.” Utilization review grants an
MCO authority to review proposed treatments and to deny coverage for any treatment
that the MCO deems to be either “experimental” or not “medically necessary.” An
MCO denying coverage for one treatment often does so with the understanding that it
will pay for another. This decision as to what treatment to cover often determines the
treatment the patient receives – particularly in the case of serious illness with expensive
treatments.
Although MCOs influence medical treatment, they are generally insulated by fed-
eral law from liability for their own negligence in denying treatment coverage. Gen-
erally, they are insulated by state law governing entity-level liability from liability for
negligence by their affiliated physicians. The doctrine of vicarious liability holds Prin-
cipals liable for torts by their Agents but generally restricts liability to torts caused by
Agents who are employees. Principals generally are not liable for torts caused by inde-
pendent contractors – even if the independent contractor has insufficient assets to pay
the tort judgment. Most MCOs hire physicians as independent contractors and thus
they usually avoid liability for the negligence of their affiliated physicians. However,
the MCOs’ capacity to influence medical treatment – both directly and through their ef-
fect on physicians – presents the question of whether MCOs should be liable for either
their own negligent treatment decisions or for physician negligence, and, if so, what is
the optimal damage award?
Beginning with Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984), the traditional analysis of
entity-level liability is based upon the standard Principal-Agent model in which a risk-
neutral principal offers an incentive contract to a risk averse Agent. They have shown
that when the Agent has limited wealth it may be efficient to shift liability to the Prin-
cipal, who then offers a contract that efficiently trades off risk against incentives to take
care. In their analysis, only the Agent directly controls care; the Agent, moreover, is
fully informed about the costs and benefits of his own actions and thus knows when he
is negligent.
Grady (1988) discusses the possibility of inadvertent negligence, but treats this risk
as exogenous and thus does not examine the impact of liability on incentives to reduce
the likelihood of inadvertent error. Shavell (1992) examines an injurer’s incentive to
invest in information about the cost of his actions. In his model, injurers who invest
in information become fully informed. Thus, when investment in information is opti-
mal, optimal tort liability eliminates accidental negligence. Chu and Qian (1995) con-
sider the consequence of incentives to collect information in a Principal-Agent context,
where the Principal must invest in monitoring to reduce the likelihood of negligence.
They find that strict liability results in the efficient outcome, yet negligence liability is
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the standard rule for most torts. As Simon (1982) has shown, negligence is preferred
to strict liability in the context of medical malpractice. In that case, Chu and Qian
(1995) show that it may be optimal to lower the negligence standard or reduce entity
level-liability.
Zeiler (2004) explicitly explores the consequence of the liability regime upon the
contract that would be agreed upon between physicians and MCOs. Attention is re-
stricted to the case in which the MCO can only contract over cost, and the physician is
restricted to a binary choice - treat or not treat. Zeiler (2004) then finds that efficiency
is enhanced when contracts are assumed to be publicly observed. In this case, she also
finds, consistent with the earlier work of Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984), that the
liability regime has no effect upon the efficiency of the outcome.1
This paper extends this research by adding two new ingredients to the traditional
Principal-Agent model. The first is to introduce the concept of “expertise.” In the tradi-
tional analysis, the Agent selects care at the time she provides the service. At that point
she trades off the cost of spending more time and effort on the case against the benefit of
making a better decision. This analysis overlooks another aspect of treatment quality,
namely the expertise of the physician in making a correct decision. This corresponds
to the time and energy spent by the physician maintaining her skills and learning about
new medical developments. Physician expertise is important because a physician does
not necessarily know the expected costs and benefits of the available treatments. By in-
vesting in expertise, a physician can increase the likelihood that she will make a correct
treatment choice, and correspondingly reduce her risk of inadvertent medical error.2
Second, this paper examines the impact of the Principal’s use of authority to di-
rectly control the Agent’s behavior on the efficiency of individual and entity-level li-
ability. Given that the MCO reimburses the costs of treatment, the physician prefers
to provide the patient with the treatment with the highest expected benefit, with little
regard to costs. To counterbalance this effect, MCOs may require “utilization review”
and refuse to cover the physician’s recommended treatment in favor of a less expen-
sive alternative treatment. The concern here is not with the details of the procedures
involved in “utilization review,” but rather we wish to explore how the tort system can
complement the current system of utilization review to achieve a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources.3 To examine this, we introduce a concept of “authority” to represent
the likelihood that a utilization review leads to a treatment that is different from the one
recommended by the physician.
The agenda of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the institutional
1 Proposition 6.
2 This interpretation is particularly relevant for medical malpractice, where much of the effect of liability
is upon diagnosis, as shown recently by Kessler and McClellan (2002)
3 Dranove and Spier (2003) show that “utilization review” can enhance efficiency by improving the
screening of cases, but do not explore the implications of their analysis for tort law. Malcomson (2004)
explores the complications involved in writing an optimal contract for the services of a health gatekeeper
whose job it is to select the apropriate physician, an issue we do not directly address here.
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and legal background that motivates the addition of expertise and authority to the stan-
dard model. A key ingredient in this model is the assumption that neither authority
nor physician expertise are contractible.4 MCOs have the right to overrule physician
decisions when the treatment is deemed “medically unnecessary,” a term that is al-
ways open to interpretation.5 Similarly, licensing boards set only minimum standards
for physicians and patients have little information regarding physician activities that
would enhance expertise beyond this minimum. The fact that authority and expertise
are not contractible provides a nontrivial role for tort law.
The formal model is introduced in section 3. It adapts Aghion and Tirole (1997)’s
theory of authority to the case of managed health care, and allows us to formally ex-
plore the impact of tort law upon the trade-off between the exercise of authority by the
MCO and the acquisition of expertise by physicians. After a discussion of the various
features of the model, we characterize the social optimum in section 3.3. Under the
appropriate conditions, we find that it is efficient for the MCO to exercise some author-
ity over treatment decisions, and that this authority decreases with physician ability.
For very able physicians, a fee-for-service system is first-best. It is a feature of the
model that the exercise of authority by the MCO unambiguously decreases quality,
even though the exercise of some authority is part of an optimal allocation.
Ex ante individuals would be willing to decrease quality in exchange for a lower
price. Of course, ex post individuals would always prefer the highest quality possi-
ble. This creates a problem when contracts are incomplete. Section 3.4 derives the
equilibrium under the hypothesis that contracts are incomplete, markets are perfectly
competitive, and there is no tort liability. The result is an inefficient equilibrium at
which the level of authority may be too high and the level of expertise is too low.
In section 4 we examine the effect of individual negligence liability imposed for
both physician negligence and negligent treatment decisions by MCOs. We find that
physician expertise and MCO authority can be returned to their first-best levels with the
introduction of tort law that allows patients to seek damages for injuries resulting from
negligent treatments. In contrast with existing law, however, liability must be imposed
for both physician and MCO negligence. In addition, the optimal damage rule is not
set equal to harm, as in the traditional analysis, but is a complex function of the harm
caused to the patient and probability that a negligent physician is detected.6 Failure to
4 As Epstein and Sykes (2001) observe, if all actions were contractible then there would be little need for
tort law.
5 The level of MCO authority is likely to be non-contractible because it is based on the notion of “med-
ically necessary” treatment, which is not precisely defined. See Arlen and MacLeod (2003): 1970-1972 &
note 148. Physician expertise also is likely to be non-contractible. Licensing boards can ensure physi-
cians meet certain bare minimum standards, but neither licensing boards nor patient contracts regu-
late exactly how much effort and attention a physician puts into keeping abreast of the latest devel-
opments and improving her skills throughout her career. Gawande (2002) provides an insightful dis-
cussion of the importance of ongoing physician investment in expertise.
6 It is well known that the probability of detection can affect the optimal damage rule, and in some cases
this implies that punitive damages may be efficient. For example, see Polinsky and Shavell (1998). We
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hold MCOs liable for negligent treatment decisions results in both inefficient authority
and inefficient physician expertise.
Negligence is efficient only if damages are set precisely equal to the optimal award.
This result contrasts with that of the traditional model of negligence, where behavior
is insensitive to excess damages because injurers can avoid liability by taking due care
(See Cooter (1984)). In our model, the efficiency of negligence liability is very sen-
sitive to excessive damages since each medical provider faces an omnipresent risk of
inadvertent error, and thus medical providers inevitably face a risk of liability. Thus,
excessive damages can distort behavior.
Section 5 extends the analysis to the case in which the MCO is able to use perfor-
mance contracts. If the MCO and the physician cannot contract between themselves to
impose reciprocal sanctions – for example, because of legal restrictions on such con-
tracts – then tort damages must incorporate the cost to both the patient and the other
medical care provider of inefficient authority or expertise.7 In this case, the optimal
damage rule is rather complex. If the MCO and the physician can contract to impose
reciprocal sanctions on each other in the event of the other’s negligence, then optimal
damages only include the cost of negligence to the patient, consistent with the current
legal standard.
Finally, assuming that damages are set equal to the cost of negligence to the patient,
we consider whether liability for physician negligence is best imposed on the physi-
cian or the MCO. Consistent with Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984), we find that
MCO liability is equivalent to pure physician liability when physicians are not judg-
ment proof, and is strictly preferred to individual liability when a physician’s limited
liability constraint is binding.8 We find that MCO liability is efficient even though
MCOs hire physicians as independent contractors. The final section of the paper con-
tains a concluding discussion.
2. Institutional and Legal Background
The health care industry provides two basic services: medical care and insurance.
At present, these services are provided through two different systems, pure indemnity
(or fee-for-service) insurance and managed care organizations (MCOs).9
Under traditional indemnity insurance, insurers pay for all treatment costs (minus a
focus on the situation where negligent defendants may escape sanction because not all negligence results in
ex post injury.
7 Although Epstein and Sykes (2001) suggest informally that making the MCO and the physician per-
sonally liable for their own errors can result in the first-best, they do not explore the impact of MCO author-
ity on optimal damages.
8 A physician is judgment proof if she does not have sufficient assets to pay damages assessed against
her.
9 We use Managed Care Organization (MCO) to refer to any insurer which seeks to influence treat-
ment choice, for example through utilization review. The term MCOs thus covers Health Maintenance Or-
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deductible); physicians select and provide treatment without interference from insurers.
Evidence suggests that fee-for-service generally results in excessively costly medical
care because physicians and patients need not consider treatment costs in selecting
between treatments.10
Medical care not only is high-cost, but treatment quality remains a concern. Ev-
idence suggests that physicians often provide substandard, negligent, medical care.11
Reducing medical negligence is difficult because physicians rarely provide substan-
dard care knowingly.12 Physicians generally err accidentally, often as a result of in-
adequate knowledge, training, or skill.13 The traditional system vests physicians with
primary authority over treatment decisions. Thus, improving treatment quality depends
on inducing each individual doctor (or practice group) to obtain sufficient expertise to
diagnose patients and assess all the available treatments.
Managed care organizations (MCOs) arose to address the problem of excessive
health care costs, while also offering the potential to improve health care quality. They
now dominate the medical insurer market.14 Most MCOs control costs, at least in
part, by requiring physicians to obtain prior approval for treatments through a process
known as “utilization review.” Under utilization review an MCO has the right to deny
coverage for certain medical treatments before treatment is provided. Because med-
ical care is complex and dynamic, MCOs do not pre-specify non-covered treatments
in their contracts with patients, but instead assert the right to deny coverage for treat-
ments that are either “experimental” or not “medically necessary and appropriate,”15
ganizations (HMOs) as well as ostensible fee-for-service insurers which employ utilization review. Our re-
sults also may apply to physician groups in California, which perform many of the same functions as
MCOs.
10 For example, Kessler and McClellan (1996) find that patient deductibles generally are capped at a
given dollar amount and do not regulate choices between expensive treatments at the margin.
11 Kohn, Corrigan, and Donaldson (2000) find that medical error results in countless injuries and approxi-
mately 98,000 deaths per year. For a discussion of other studies of error see, Arlen and MacLeod
(2003), 1938-39.
12 Patient care depends upon physicians maintaining ongoing investments in expertise. Medical care is
a dynamic technology. Every day new treatments are invented and new evidence emerges of the ef-
fectiveness of existing practices. Gelijns, Zivin, and Nelson (2001), p. 914, find that in a single year, the
Food and Drug Administration approved about 5,000 new and modified devices; each year approxi-
mately 35 percent of the 200 largest-selling prescription drugs are new.
13 Greiner and Knebel (2003), p. 111, find that 20 to 50 percent of primary care physicians are not aware
of (or are not using) new evidence on best medical practices. In addition, Krizek (2000), p. 1362, finds that
20 to 80 percent of surgical error is directly or indirectly caused by inadequate expertise (including medical
personnel having inadequate knowledge or failing to employ knowledge they have, inadequate supervision
of residents, and physician failure to update practice protocols). A single individual responsible for error
could be identified in almost 38 percent of the cases of medical error (Id. at p. 1359).
14 Glied and Zivin (2002) find that in 1997 only 2 percent of health plans conformed to traditional fee-for-
service, while 98 percent of health plans are either managed care or fee-for-service with utilization review.
15 The term “medically necessary and appropriate” is sufficiently vague to enable an MCO to categorize a
treatment as not medically necessary even when most medical experts would disagree. See Korobkin
(1999), p.31, for a discussion of the wide variation in insurance companies’ views of what constitutes
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and determine whether a treatment is covered only once that treatment is requested.16
Utilization review effectively gives MCOs substantial authority to determine what
treatments they will pay for (and, in turn, what expensive treatments patients receive)
after contracting with the patient. If properly implemented, this process can improve
health quality by providing a centralized decision maker with the capacity to collect
and analyze complex national data on best medical practices. Yet MCO authority may
result in patients receiving suboptimal care either because the MCO explicitly denies
coverage for expensive cost-justified treatment in favor of suboptimal treatment, or
because the utilization review process itself injures the patient by delaying the provision
of time-sensitive treatment.17
Evidence on the actual effect of utilization review suggests that while it has been
effective at reducing treatment costs, its effects on expected treatment quality have
been more variable. A review of empirical studies on MCOs’ cost-control mechanisms
suggests that mechanisms such as utilization review either lower treatment quality or,
at best, leave it unchanged.18 There is also evidence to suggest that MCOs have used
their authority over which hospitals their patients use to direct patients to lower-cost,
but also lower-quality, hospitals.19
The expected cost and quality of patient care thus depends directly on actions taken
by both physicians and MCOs. The present system regulates treatment quality in part
“medically appropriate” or “experimental” treatments.
16 See Hall and Anderson (1992), pp.1638-41. Most MCOs assert the right to determine coverage free
from external review of treatment coverage denials. Increasingly, states now mandate independent external
review of treatment denials. Yet even with external review, utilization review directly affects treatment.
Many patients do not appeal denials (in part because some MCOs have gag clauses that preclude physicians
from effectively objecting to MCO treatment denials). See, for example, Havighurst (2001). Second,
patient appeals cannot reverse the negative effects of an initial treatment denial if the appeals process
introduces sufficient enough delay to render the recommended treatment ineffective.
17 The utilization review process itself may alter treatment even if the MCO wants to provide optimal
care. MCOs necessarily make initial treatment coverage decisions based on summary information that
is less nuanced and patient-specific than the information available to a physician. This may lead an MCO
to deny medically necessary treatment because the MCO is less well-informed. MCOs cannot always
remedy these initial errors through patient appeals because the appeal process may introduce sufficient
delay that the patient can no longer benefit from the recommended treatment (or any other treatment). E.g.,
Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare, 208 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (EDNY, 2001), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
321 F.3d 83 (2nd Cir. 2003) (alleging that delay between the MCO’s initial denial, and subsequent approval
of, physician-recommended cancer treatment rendered the treatment ineffective); see Roark v. Humana,
Inc., 307 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2002) (alleging that Aetna’s initial refusal to approve the arthritis drug
Vioxx – which carries a low ulcer risk – forced the patient to take an alternative drug, which gave the patient
bleeding ulcers, rendering the patient unable to take Vioxx or any other medication absorbed through
the stomach).
18 See Sullivan (1999) for a review of existing studies that suggest that MCOs’ cost-containment mea-
sures result in patients getting either inferior or equal health quality. There also is evidence that both seri-
ously ill and poor patients suffer worse outcomes under managed care. See Duggan (2002) and Aizer, Cur-
rie, and Moretti (2004) for some more recent evidence.
19 See Arlen and MacLeod (2003) 1977 for further discussion of this problem.
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through tort liability imposed for medical negligence.20 A physician who provides
negligent medical treatment – as measured by the customary medical care – faces lia-
bility in tort should that treatment injure a patient. Yet, MCOs generally avoid liability
for both their own negligence in denying coverage for medically appropriate treatments
and for negligence by their affiliated physicians.21
Patients are seeking the right to pursue two different types of claims against MCOs.
The first are direct actions against MCOs for negligent coverage determinations that
result in the patient being injured by the denial of medically necessary and appropriate
medical care. At present, both state and federal laws impose impediments to these
suits. Many states do not permit recovery for negligent refusal to provide insurance
coverage, even when it results in the patient receiving negligent treatment. Moreover,
in those states permitting such actions, patients’ right to recover from MCOs under
state law is precluded by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).22
The second class of claims are indirect claims seeking to hold MCOs liable for neg-
ligence by their affiliate physicians. While ERISA is likely to pose less of a problem
for these actions, state law governing entity-level liability generally insulates MCOs.
Under state law governing entity-level liability, MCOs are not liable for physician neg-
ligence if the physician is an independent contractor and the MCO ensured that its
subscribers knew that the physician was not an employee.23 Most MCOs thus should
be able to avoid liability for physician negligence because they do not actually employ
physicians, but instead offer health care services through a network of independent
contractors.
Congress is considering legislation that would significantly change the legal land-
scape for MCOs. Several proposals would amend federal law to permit state law tort
actions against MCOs for personal injury or death against any person resulting from
the denial of treatment coverage. Legislatures also are considering MCO liability for
injuries resulting from physician negligence. This article evaluates whether imposing
negligence liability for MCOs’ negligent treatment coverage decisions or for physician
negligence would improve the joint welfare of patients, MCOs, and physicians.
3. The Model and Preliminary Analysis
Consider a three-Agent model consisting of a patient, an insurer, and a physician.
The risk-neutral and liquidity-constrained patient seeks two types of medical services:
20 For a discussion of the limits of direct regulation of physician quality through licensing requirements
and other regulations, see, e.g., Arlen and MacLeod (2003), notes 108, 109, 123, and 128.
21 See Arlen and MacLeod (2003) for a more extensive discussion of the legal issues.
22 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 USC § 1001-1461 (1974).
23 The MCO may be liable under ostensible agency if the MCO holds the physician out as an employee
and the patient relies on this. MCOs can avoid liability under ostensible agency by making sure patients are
informed that physicians are independent contractors and not employees.
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medical treatment and insurance.24 The patient seeks medical treatment from a physi-
cian who is the exclusive provider of medical services. Insurance is provided by a
specialized MCO who reimburses the physician for treatment costs.
The MCO is assumed to operate in a competitive market making zero profits. Thus,
the patient’s premium, P, equals the MCO’s expected costs of providing insurance.
The MCO also contracts with the physician, agreeing both to pay all treatment costs
and to pay the physician an ex ante wage of W . The physician is assumed to earn her
reservation utility of U0.
For any given illness, there are a variety of possible treatments, t ∈ T = {1, ....., n},
with different consequences for the patient and the MCO. The expected benefit of any
given treatment is bt, which is net of any expected adverse consequences, lt. As bt is
an expectation taken over a distribution of potential outcomes resulting from treatment
t, ex ante expectations can differ from ex post outcomes. The cost of providing the
treatment is ct, which is borne by the insurer. The concept of a “treatment” is very
general. It includes differences in treatment type (for example, medication or surgery),
as well as differences in how and when a given procedure is performed. For example,
a procedure performed immediately is deemed a different treatment than the same pro-
cedure performed a week later if the delay affects the expected benefit (or costs) of the
treatment.25
The patient does not have sufficient information to either diagnose himself or select
treatment, and thus delegates authority to select treatment to a medical professional
(either the physician or the MCO). A patient who selects MCO insurance vests the
MCO with the right to determine who will select the treatment he receives. If the MCO
does not assert authority over treatment choice, the physician selects the treatment, as
discussed below.
The MCO determines its authority level based on the relative costs and benefits to
it of authority. Vesting the physician with authority over treatment potentially raises
a moral hazard problem because neither the physician nor the patient bears the cost of
any treatment provided. The net expected benefit of physician-selected treatment also
depends on the probability that the physician errs. To select the treatment correctly,
the physician must be informed about both the proper diagnosis and the net benefit of
available treatments. To obtain this information the physician must invest in expertise
(both pre- and post-contract). This in turn determines the probability that she errs and
inadvertently provides erroneous treatment. A physician who errs not only risks injury
to the patient, but also potentially imposes costs directly on the MCO (to the extent
that additional treatment is needed to remedy the error). The physician can reduce, but
not eliminate, the probability that she errs by investing in expertise post-contract. As
discussed in the previous section, it is assumed that it is not possible to contract directly
24 The patient and the physician are assumed to be liquidity constrained to generate a market for insurance
provided by someone other than the physician.
25 Thus utilization review can affect treatment choice if it introduces delay that materially alters either
expected patient outcomes or treatment costs.
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over the level of expertise.
The MCO cannot directly control the physician’s recommendation, but can alter the
choice of treatment by asserting authority over treatment choice when it has sufficient
information to suggest that a lower-cost treatment exists that is acceptable (given the
loose constraints placed by its contract with the patient). In some cases, this treatment
lowers costs while still providing the patient with the same benefits as informed physi-
cian treatment. In other cases, it lowers treatment costs by providing suboptimal quality
treatment that injures the patient. The MCO determines its authority level ex post after
contracting with the patient. This authority is formally defined by the probability that
a decision is overruled, and is assumed to be unobservable and non-contractible.
The decision sequence is summarized as follows:
1. The patient contracts with an insurance company that is assumed to be in a perfectly
competitive industry, and thus earns zero profits.
2. The insurance company then contracts with the physician, who is also assumed to
be in a perfectly competitive market, with a default utility of U0.
3. The MCO and the physician make non-contractible investment decisions: the level
of authority, in the case of the MCO, and the level of expertise, in the case of the
physician.
4. If the patient falls ill, she contacts a physician for treatment. For simplicity, this
occurs with probability 1.
5. The physician recommends treatment, which may be overruled by the MCO in favor
of an alternative treatment.
6. The patient is treated, and faces a chance of inadequate care.
7. Treatment outcomes are revealed. The patient files suit if care is inadequate, and
damages are positive.
Physician Treatment Choice
Ex ante – at the moment of contracting – the patient would like to contract to receive
the treatment that maximizes the total expected benefit of treatment minus treatment
costs. When ill, however, the insured patient would like to receive the treatment with
the maximum expected benefit regardless of cost, because he does not bear treatment
costs. Thus, the patient would like to receive treatment t∗, where t∗ = argmaxt∈T{bt}.
The expected benefit and cost of treatment t∗ are given by b∗ and c∗, respectively.
The patient delegates initial authority over treatment choice to the physician. The
physician is assumed to care directly about the welfare of her patients, in addition to
caring about any pecuniary rewards. Thus, the physician benefits directly from good
treatment outcomes (and bears a direct cost of adverse outcomes). To capture this, it
is assumed that the physician obtains a direct benefit from providing treatment t given
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by αbt, where α reflects either physician compassion, the impact of norms (e.g., the
Hippocratic oath), or the effect of patient outcomes on physician reputation.26 While
treatment outcomes affect the physician, it is assumed that they affect her less than they
affect the patient. In other words, 1 > α ≥ 0. Thus, a physician who kills a patient
suffers a loss, but the loss is less than that suffered by the patient himself. The absolute
value of α is referred to as the physician’s level of “compassion.” A physician with
α = 0 is referred to as a non-compassionate physician.
Whenever α > 0, the physician wants to provide the treatment that maximizes bt.
Thus, she endeavors to provide treatment t∗ = argmaxt∈T{bt}, which is the patient’s
ex post preferred treatment. Although the physician wants to provide treatment t∗, in
practice she may fail to do so because she is “uninformed.” Providing medical care
is a complex task involving uncertainty about the patient’s condition, as well as the
nature of the available treatments and their expected outcomes. A physician who is
“uninformed” about the patient’s condition or the true net benefits of the available
treatments may inadvertently err and provide erroneous medical treatment, given by bt.
The physician can reduce her risk of error by investing in “expertise.” We focus
on one particular type of expertise: post-contractual investments that affect whether
the physician is correctly informed regarding the best treatment for any and all of her
patients.27 This expertise includes a physician’s post-contractual efforts to improve her
diagnostic skills, her understanding of the expected benefits of all available treatments,
and her ability to provide treatments – for example, by doing rounds in a hospital,
reading the latest medical journals, participating in continuing medical education, and
attending conferences.
Expertise reduces the probability of accidental medical error. To model this, we em-
ploy the approach of Aghion and Tirole (1997) and assume that investment in expertise
increases the probability that the physician is “informed” and able to accurately assess
the costs and benefits of the available treatments. The probability that the physician
is informed is given by e; the probability that she is uninformed (and errs) is given by
(1− e). The cost to the physician of acquiring expertise is given by VD (e) /θD, where
θD represents the physician’s innate ability and VD (0) = V 0D (0) = 0, V 00D (e) > 0,
and lime→1 VD (e) = ∞. Expertise is assumed to be non-contractible, as it is either
non-observable or non-verifiable. When selecting treatment, the physician knows her
level of expertise – and thus her probability of error – but she does not know whether
she is informed or uninformed in any particular case. Error, thus, is truly inadvertent.
It is assumed that erroneous treatment bt on average produces lower gross – and net
26 The parameter α may be employed to model physician reputation when the benefit to the physician of
good treatment outcomes (and the cost to the physician of bad outcomes) is less than the direct benefit
(or cost) to the patient of treatment.
27 Patient care depends on physicians maintaining on-going investments in expertise. Medical care
is a dynamic technology. Every day new treatments are invented and new evidence emerges on the effec-
tiveness of existing practices. E.g., Gelijns, Zivin, and Nelson (2001), p.914, (In a single year, the
Food and Drug Administration approved about 5,000 new and modified devices; approximately 35 per-
cent of the 200 largest-selling prescription drugs are new each year).
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– patient outcomes than expected treatment t∗, namely b < b∗ and b − c < b∗ − c∗,
where c is the cost of erroneous treatment and b is the expected benefit of erroneous
treatment. The expected benefit of the treatment provided by the physician is therefore
eb∗+(1−e)b,which is less than the expected benefit of the patient’s preferred treatment
t∗. Under these assumptions, injurious treatment costs c might be greater or less than
than noninjurious treatement costs c∗.
Although the expected benefit of erroneous treatment is less than the expected ben-
efit of the patient’s preferred treatment (b∗ > b), a patient provided erroneous treatment
t may, in fact, emerge unharmed. A treatment may be negligent ex ante, and yet not
result in any legally recognizable ex post injury. For example, a physician who fails to
treat a patient presenting symptoms of a serious life-threatening disease may provide
negligent care ex ante, and yet not cause an injury ex post if, in fact, the patient’s con-
dition was temporary and did not need treatment.28 To model the possibility of error
that does not cause ex post injury, it is assumed that when a physician errs and pro-
vides treatment t there is a probability πD < 1 that the error injures the patient and a
probability 1 − πD that the error does not injure the patient. The expected benefit of
“injurious” error is given by be, where be < b∗. The expected benefit of non-injurious
errors is assumed to be b∗. Thus, the expected benefit of erroneous treatment is given
by b = πDbe + (1− πD)b∗.
MCO Treatment Choice
The MCO agrees to provide the patient with necessary medical services in exchange
for a fixed fee. The insurance motive is not explicitly modeled, rather it is assumed that
the MCO reimburses the patient for all out-of-pocket approved medical expenses for a
fixed insurance premium, given by P.
The MCO-physician relationship is subject to a moral hazard problem because the
physician would like to select the treatment that maximizes patient outcomes without
regard to cost.29 The MCO, however, bears the full treatment costs of any approved
treatment provided and thus, all else equal, would prefer that the physician provide low
cost treatment.
The MCO regulates treatment choice by asserting authority over treatment selec-
28 For example, a physician is negligent if she fails to test or treat a patient with the classic symptoms of
meningitis because bacterial meningitis is easily detected (and treated) and can kill a patient in a matter of
days. Nevertheless, the negligent treatment will not injure any untreated patient lucky enough to have
viral meningitis, which is self-limiting.
29 The moral hazard problem explored here is different from the traditional moral hazard problem, as
in, for example, Holmstrom (1979) or Shavell (1979). In the standard problem, the Principal has an
external measure of performance and makes compensation an increasing function of this performance
measure to provide appropriate performance incentives. Here, the nature of medical treatment is such
that critical information regarding the patient’s illness and the evaluation of acceptable treatments come
from the physician herself. With the physician in substantial control of the signal, the MCO cannot rely on
this mechanism to control moral hazard.
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tion through a process called utilization review.30 The MCO reviews some portion of
the physician’s treatment recommendations and overrules the physician when its in-
formation indicates that a lower cost treatment is available that arguably satisfies the
contractual requirement that the treatment be medically appropriate.31 This treatment
is given by t0.
Although the MCO has broad discretion to overrule the physician, it does not always
do so because asserting authority is expensive. As in Aghion and Tirole (1997), to as-
sert authority, the MCO must invest in an information system at a cost VI (a) ,where
VI (0) = V
0
I (0) = 0, V
00
I (a) > 0, and lima→1 VI (a) = ∞. This investment deter-
mines the probability that the MCO asserts authority to alter a decision by the physi-
cian. This probability is given by a. The MCO cannot credibly precommit to a partic-
ular level of authority in its contract with the patient, and thus determines its authority
level post-contract, after the premium is paid.32
The MCO determines which treatment it will select post-contract, after the premium
is paid. Absent intervening forces, the MCO thus would have an incentive to select
the cost-minimizing treatment, even if suboptimal, because the MCO bears treatment
costs but, post-contract, does not benefit directly from improved patient outcomes.33
The MCO is constrained (imperfectly) from pure pursuit of cost-minimization in its
treatment choice by the MCO-patient contract (and by reputation), and thus selects
treatment t∗ in some cases. In other cases, the MCO selects the cost-minimizing treat-
ment. In some cases the cost-minimizing treatment provides the best patient outcomes
(t∗ = t0) (for example, providing aspirin to a heart attack victim). Nevertheless, in
other cases MCO authority results in the patient receiving suboptimal treatment either
because the MCO is not fully informed about the patient’s condition or because its
assertion of authority introduces sufficient enough delay that it results in the patient
receiving suboptimal treatment.
To model this, it is assumed that the MCO asserts authority when it can recommend
a treatment t0 that lowers treatment costs relative to the costs of expected physician-
30 The dual moral hazard problem between the physician and the MCO regarding treatment costs and
the physician and the patient regarding expertise (and potential treatment) distinguishes our analysis of
entity-level liability from Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984).
31 In fact, in actual practice, MCOs can, and do, deny coverage for treatments that are "experimental"
even if no alternative treatment exist.
32 MCOs cannot contract over authority by pre-specifying all approved treatments because there are too
many illnesses and too many treatments. Also, too many patient-specific factors are relevant to treatment
choice. This is compounded by the dynamics of medical technology that make it impossible for an MCO to
precommit to a particular treatment for each and every illness. Moreover, MCOs cannot share explicit
utilization review guidelines with physicians or patients for fear that physicians will alter the information
they provide to MCOs in order to help patients obtain coverage.
33 Market forces (e.g., reputation) may ensure that the MCO obtains some post-contractual benefit from
patient outcomes. Our results do not turn on the assumption of zero-benefit. They depend only on the
milder assumption that the MCO obtains less post-contractual benefit from good patient outcomes than
does either the patient herself or the physician.
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selected treatment: thus, c0 < ec∗ + (1 − e)bc.34 When the MCO asserts authority
to select t0, with probability 1 − πI , its substitute treatment provides the patient with
the same expected benefit as informed-physician treatment, b∗, but at lower cost. With
probability πI , treatment t0 lowers expected costs to c0, but injures the patient by
providing suboptimal benefits be, equivalent to injurious erroneous physician treatment.
Thus, the expected benefit from the MCO decision is b0 = πIbe +
¡
1− πI¢ b∗, and
satisfies b∗ > b0 > b > be.
To analyze the general case, it is assumed that the expected benefit of MCO-selected
treatment, b0 = πIbe+
¡
1− πI¢ b∗, may be greater than or less than the expected bene-
fit of physician-selected treatment, eb∗+(1−e)b, depending in part on physician exper-
tise. Where the MCO asserts authority, we assume that the patient receives the MCO-
selected treatment, even if b0 < eb∗ + (1− e)b. Adhering to the MCO’s choice is both
ex ante and ex post rational for the patient, provided that the benefit of MCO-approved
treatment b0 exceeds the net benefit to the patient of recommended treatment minus
treatment costs, given that the patient need not pay for covered treatment but must pay
the entire cost of uncovered treatment herself: b0 > eb∗+(1−e)b−{ec∗ + (1− e)c} .
The Social Optimum
The expected payoffs of the MCO, the physician, and, the patient can now be de-
fined as a function of the main choice variables: the level of expertise of the physician
(the probability e, of being informed) and the level of authority exerted by the MCO
(the probability a that the MCO overrules the physician’s decision). The direct ex-
pected benefit to the patient of treatment is B(a, e), and is defined by:
B (a, e) = a · b0 + (1− a) [e · b∗ + (1− e)b].
The corresponding expected cost of treatment is C(a, e) and is defined by:
C (a, e) = a · c0 + (1− a) [e · c∗ + (1− e) c].
The patient has income I, and pays a premium P to the MCO, and hence has utility:
UP (P, a, e) = I − P +B (a, e) .
The MCO receives payment P as income, pays compensation W to the physician, and
incurs investment cost VI (a) and C (a, e) for any additional medical services ordered
by either the physician or the MCO. The MCO’s payoff is:
UI (P,W, a, e) = P −W −C (a, e)− VI (a) .
Finally, the physician earns nonpecuniary benefits αB (a, e) from treating the patient,
and pecuniary benefits W , and bears cost VD (e) /θ to maintain a level of expertise e.
34 When the MCO decides whether to assert authority, it does not know the cost of physician-selected
treatment with certainty. The actual cost of physician-selected treatment will differ from c∗ if the physician
erred in her diagnosis and treatment selection.
14
The physician’s utility is given by:
UD (W,a, e) =W + αB (a, e)− VD (e) /θ.
Both the MCO and the physician are assumed to be in competitive markets, with
the profits of the MCO normalized to zero, while the alternative utility of the physician
is U0.
The optimal allocation under the hypothesis that expertise and authority are con-
tractible maximizes the patient’s utility subject to the constraints that both the MCO
and the physician receive at least their alternative payoffs:
max
P,W,a,e
UP (P, a, e) = I − P +B (a, e) , (1)
subject to:
UI (P,W, a, e) = P −W −C (a, e)− VI (a) ≥ 0, (2)
UD (W,a, e) =W + αB (a, e)− VD (e) /θ ≥ U0. (3)
At the optimum, the individual rationality constraints 2 and 3 are binding. The
individual rationality constraint for the physician impliesW = VD (e) /θ−αB (a, e)+
U0, while for the MCO one has P = W + C (a, e) + VI (a) . Substituting these into
the payoff for the patient, one obtains the following expression for net social welfare
as a function of authority and expertise:
SW (a, e) = I + (1 + α)B (a, e)−C (a, e)− VI (a)− VD (e) /θ − U0. (4)
Differentiating, we can solve this problem using reaction functions. Given a level
of authority a the optimal level of expertise E (a) solves:
V 0D(E(a))/θ = (1 + α)Be −Ce (5)
where
Be(a, e) = (1− a) (b∗ − b), (6)
Ce(a, e) = (1− a) (c∗ − c). (7)
Observe that expertise increases the net benefit to the parties of treatment whenever
authority is less than perfect (a < 1): (1 + α)Be − Ce > 0. Since this expression is
independent of expertise, then equation (5) uniquely defines expertise as a function of
authority. Given that the right-hand side of (5) is decreasing in authority, and V 00D < 0,
then expertise decreases with authority. In addition, the reaction curve E (a) shifts
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The optimal level of authority as a function of expertise, A (e) , solves:35
V 0I (A(e)) =
 (1 + α)Ba −Ca, if (1 + α)Ba −Ca > 0,0, if not. (8)
where
Ba(a, e) = b
0 − {eb∗ + (1− e)bb}, (9)
Ca(a, e) = c
0 − {ec∗ + (1− e) c}. (10)




−¡c0 − c¢ > 0,
while it is less than zero when e = 1. Therefore, when expertise is low, it is optimal
to exercise some authority, and the level of authority satisfies the first line of equation
(8). When expertise is sufficiently high that (1 + α)Ba − Ca ≤ 0, then exercising no
authority is efficient, as given by the second line of equation (8). This is illustrated in
35 Notice that the level of ability does not affect the reaction curve for authority, while b0 and c0 do not
affect the reaction curves for expertise, and hence we can view these parameters as primitives describing
the behavior of the physician and the insurer, respectively. In particular, notice that increasing physician
ability shifts reaction curve E (a) up, and hence for sufficiently high θ it is the case that it is efficient
to have no insurer control, while the converse is true when θ is low.
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figure 1. This figure also illustrates the solution to program (1) by the intersection of
the two reaction curves for authority and expertise.
Notice the effect of physician ability on the optimal solution. When physician abil-
ity is low, the expected quality of physician treatment is lower, and the optimal solution
entails some positive level of authority by the MCO. When physician ability increases
with all other parameters held fixed, optimal physician expertise (and expected treat-
ment quality) increases and the optimal level of authority falls. When expertise is
sufficiently high, then exerting no authority is optimal and fee-for-service insurance is
preferable to MCO insurance.
The term “ability” needs to be interpreted broadly as measuring the relative cost
to the MCO and physician of making informed treatment decisions. The modern rise
of MCO authority is, in part, a response to technological improvement, particularly
in information technology, that allows health care providers to compile information
and respond in a timely fashion to treatment requests – something that would not have
been possible before the advent of modern computer technology. For frequent illness
where the MCO has extensive data, and where the optimal treatment varies little across
patients, it is likely to be efficient for the MCO to exert authority (when it has optimal
incentives). In contrast, it will often not be optimal for the MCO to assert authority with
respect to illnesses where the physician can more accurately assess optimal treatment
at lower cost – as is likely when the determination of the optimal treatment depends
heavily upon patient-specific characteristics that the MCO cannot easily assess from
afar.
Equilibrium with Incomplete Contracts
As discussed above, it is not possible for the patient and the MCO to contract ex
ante over what treatments the MCO or the physician will select for any given illness
once the patient gets ill. To model this, it is assumed that at stage 3 in the decision
sequence the MCO and the physician simultaneously choose the level of authority and
expertise, respectively. Neither the MCO nor the physician can observe the actual ex
post choice of the other, but each has rational expectations regarding these choices.
The patient cannot observe the actual ex post choice of either the MCO or physician,
but has rational expectations regarding these choices.




I − P +B (a, e) . (11)
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subject to:
P −W −C (a, e)− VI (a) ≥ 0, (12)
W + αB (a, e)− VD (e) /θ ≥ U0D, (13)
a ∈ arg max
a0∈[0,1]
P −W −C ¡a0, e¢− VI ¡a0¢ , (14)





¢− VD ¡e0¢ /θ. (15)
As in the Principal-Agent literature (e.g., Holmstrom (1979)), we can model con-
tract selection with non-contractible authority and expertise as an optimization problem
with individual rationality constraints, (12) and (13), and incentive compatibility con-
straints, (14) and (15), for the MCO and the physician, respectively. As in the standard
Principal-Agent model, this approach implicitly supposes that when the MCO or the
physician is indifferent between two actions, then the action that is favorable to the
patient is selected.
This problem can be solved as follows. Observe that once the contract has been
signed, the MCO and the physician select authority and expertise simultaneously, under
the hypothesis that they have correct expectations regarding the choice of the other
party. In essence, the contract defines a two-player game between the MCO and the
physician, with the outcome given by the Nash Equilibrium of this game. The solution
can be found by characterizing the reaction function for each party, and then finding
the equilibrium.
Let Ac (e) denote the MCO’s optimal choice of authority given the physician’s ex-
pertise e. This function satisfies the first-order conditions for (14):
−Ca (e) = V 0I (Ac (e))
where Ca (e) = c0 − {ec∗ + (1− e) c}, as given by (10). Similarly, the physician’s
optimal choice of expertise, given the level of authority, is denoted by Ec (a) , and
satisfies the corresponding first-order condition for (15):




where Be (a) = (1− a) (b∗ −bb), as in (6).
Observe that the first-order conditions do not depend upon either the price P nor the
wage W, and hence, the choice of authority and expertise is independent of the outside
options for the MCO and the physician. Formally, the solution to the post-contract
game is characterized as follows:
Definition A Nash Equilibrium for the medical services game is a pair {a (ω) , e (ω)}
solving:
a (ω) = Ac (e (ω)) ,
e (ω) = Ec (a (ω)) ,
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where ω is the vector of exogenous parameters.
This solution is illustrated in figure two. Observe that at the incomplete-contracts
equilibrium with no sanctions, the MCO invariably asserts authority, regardless of the
level of expertise, even if the fee-for-service system would be the first-best. Thus, the
MCO asserts authority to reduce expected treatment costs even when doing so reduces
the expected net benefit of medical care: (1+α)Ba−Ca < 0. The slope of the MCO’s
reaction function depends upon the sign of c∗ − c. When this is positive, namely when
informed physicians provide more costly treatment than uninformed physicians, then
in equilibrium high-ability physicians face more control. This is because the gain in
cost savings is greatest with this group. In contrast, when c∗ < c the MCOs exert more






Ec(a) - High Ability
No Control Complete Control
Ec(a) - Low Ability
Ac(e) - c > c*^ Ac(e) - c < c*^
Figure 2
The properties of the complete solution to the provision of medical services under
incomplete contracts are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 There is a solution to program 11 such that every equilibrium (ac, ec)
has the properties:
1. Both authority and expertise are strictly positive, but there is less-than-perfect con-
trol, ac,ec ∈ (0, 1) .
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2. At an equilibrium SWe (ac,ec) > 0, and hence increasing expertise at an equilib-
rium always increases social welfare. Welfare is also increasing with physician
ability θ.
3. SWa (ac, ec) < 0 if and only if b0 < {eb∗ + (1− e)bb}, decreasing authority at an
equilibrium increases social welfare whenever the benefit from MCO treatment is
less than the expected benefit of physician-selected treatment.
Proof. See Appendix.
If authority and expertise are non-contractible, then the equilibrium absent liability
is suboptimal notwithstanding the assumption that all parties know each other’s payoff
functions and accurately predict each other’s behavior in equilibrium. Behavior by both
the physician and the MCO is suboptimal absent sanctions because each affects care
post-contract, and does not bear the full impact of their actions on either each other or
on the patient.
The conclusion that the no-sanction equilibrium is inefficient, even when patients
accurately predict the parties’ behavior, contrasts with the result of the classic model
of accidents. In that model, when injurers and victims are in a market relationship
the market alone can induce optimal caretaking when victims accurately predict the
risks imposed upon them.36 Proposition 1 illustrates that despite accurate customer
expectations and competitive markets, if expected accident costs depend upon non-
contractible, post-contractual actions by the injurer, then the result may be an ineffi-
cient allocation of resources. In such situations, a victim’s ex ante ability to accurately
“price” expected accident costs is not sufficient to ensure that, after the contract price is
paid, the injurer faces optimal incentives to take victim costs into account. In this case,
the injurer will take too little “care,” even though the parties jointly would be better off
if the injurer could make a credible ex ante commitment to take due care.
4. Optimal Damages with Individual Liability
This section considers whether social welfare could be improved through the use
of sanctions for medical malpractice. Only negligence liability is considered because
this rule currently governs medical malpractice cases, and it is the basis of the leading
proposals in Congress for MCO liability. This section considers a regime of individual
liability for negligence under which the physician and the MCO are governed by a
negligence liability rule as to their treatment decisions, but neither is liable for negligent
treatment provided by the other. Thus the physician is potentially liable for treatments
she selects and provides. The MCO, in contrast with existing law, is potentially liable
for treatments that it selects.37
36 See Shavell (1980), pp. 4-5, pp. 20-22, and Sykes (1984), p. 1256.
37 This is also the rule suggested by Epstein and Sykes (2001) to address the problem of negligent acts
committed by the MCO.
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Under negligence liability, a medical care professional is liable if she selected a
“negligent” treatment that injured the patient. Consistent with existing law, it is as-
sumed that negligence liability depends upon the quality of the treatment provided,
and not the quality (expertise) of the medical provider. We also assume that negli-
gence is determined with respect to medical custom. Thus, a treatment is negligent if it
provided the patient with lower expected benefits than the “customary” treatment pro-
vided by an informed physician (t∗). It is assumed that courts can assess whether the
medical professional was negligent, but that they cannot determine optimal expertise
or authority.38
Negligence is actionable only if the patient is injured. Thus, an uninformed physi-
cian is not liable every time she provides erroneous treatment t; instead she is liable
only if the treatment injured the patient (which occurs with probability πD). The MCO
faces potential liability only when it selected negligent treatment that injured the pa-
tient, which occurs with probability πI .39
The present analysis extends the traditional model of negligence by permitting for-
mal consideration of accidental, or inadvertent, negligence, the probability of which
can be reduced, but not eliminated, through expertise. The traditional model of acci-
dents assumes that injurers (here, medical professionals) know when they are being
negligent. Thus, they will not be negligent if damages are set sufficiently high to in-
duce due care (see Shavell (1980)). This framework does not appear to capture an
essential feature of medical malpractice because physicians rarely knowingly decide
to provide substandard care. The present model permits consideration of such errors
through the assumption that even compassionate physicians can err and injure a patient
with probability (1− e)πD.40
The present analysis examines negligence liability relative to a system where there
is no intervention at all. The relative merits of negligence and quality regulation are
not formally considered. Nevertheless, while quality regulation has an important role to
play, there still may be benefits from providing additional incentives via the tort system
because regulations must be set in advance, and cannot dynamically adjust to new and
changing conditions. Thus, the level of expertise considered here should be interpreted
as the amount of expertise above the minimum level set by regulatory agencies.
38 In order to focus on expertise and authority, we do not examine the impact of tort liability on treatment
choice. We evaluate the role of medical negligence, accepting the constraint that due care is based on t∗.
Yet even when due care is set too high (at t∗), we find that the tort system can improve the parties’
joint welfare.
39 In order to focus on the authority decision, we assume that the probability that the MCO is negligent if
it asserts authority is exogenously given by πI . In other words, we focus on patient injuries that result
from the assertion of authority itself. MCO authority may injure the patient even if the MCO wants
to select t∗, either because the MCO is less well-informed than the physician (and does not know it),
or utilization review delays time-sensitive treatment. Extending the model to permit MCOs to intentionally
select negligent treatments absent tort liability would strengthen our argument for imposing liability on
MCOs.
40 See text preceding note 1 discussing the prior literature on inadvertent error and learning about risk.
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Optimal Damages for Individual Negligence
The first question to be addressed is the optimal level of damages that induce the
MCO and the physician to select the socially optimal levels of authority and expertise,
respectively. Let the expected damage award for physician negligence be LD, and the
damage award for MCO negligence be LI . It is assumed that the patient, MCO, and
the physician all know the current liability rule before entering into a contract. Accord-
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¢− (1− a)(1− e0)πDLDª− VD ¡e0¢ /θ.
This problem is the same as the incomplete contract problem in the previous section,
with the MCO facing an additional cost LI whenever it exerts authority and injures the
patient, and the physician facing an expected liability LD when she provides negligent
(uninformed) treatment that injures the patient.
In the case of the MCO, the marginal impact of an increase in liability on profits
is −aπI and hence increasing its liability decreases the authority it exerts (as long as
a > 0), while increasing the liability of the physician results in an increase in expertise.
Also notice that the marginal impact of expertise decreases with authority.
Proposition 2 The following expected damage rules result in the optimal level of au-
thority and expertise:




LI = (1 + α)
½
(b∗ − be)− (1− e




where e∗ is the optimal level of expertise.
Proof. See Appendix.
Imposing liability for both MCO and physician negligence increases the parties’
joint welfare relative to the no-sanction equilibrium by inducing optimal expertise and
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authority. Liability enhances the parties’ welfare by enabling the physician and the
MCO to credibly commit to undertaking optimal behavior: the promise to invest op-
timally in expertise and to assert optimal authority is credible because the imposition
of optimal liability renders optimal behavior ex post incentive compatible for the MCO
and the physician.
Proposition 2 shows that optimal damages for medical negligence place more ex-
acting requirements on courts than the standard analysis of accidents would suggest. In
the standard model, negligence liability forms a lower bound on damages because any
potential injurer can completely avoid liability by taking due care (see Cooter (1984)).
Thus, excessive damages do not distort behavior.41 In this model, damages must be
set precisely at the optimal level, LD and LI , because excessive damages would cause
physicians to over invest in expertise.42
Proposition 2 also shows that the standard rule of damages equal to the plaintiff’s
harm is not necessarily efficient in this agency context. As is well-established, the goal
of tort liability is to internalize external costs. In some cases this is accomplished by
setting damages equal to the victim’s loss. This does not always apply in an agency
setting when both the Principal (the MCO) and the Agent (the physician) take actions
that affect the quality of the service to be provided. In this case, in order to induce
optimal expertise when the MCO does not sanction the physician itself, damages for
physician error must equal the expected harm to both the patient (b∗ − be) , and the
MCO (c− c∗) , arising from the provision of uninformed treatment.43
Thus, the patient’s damage award must be adjusted by the term (cˆ−c
∗)
πD , which rep-
resents the expected difference in costs divided by the probability of a harm being
committed when the physician is uninformed.44 Expected optimal damages exceed the
patient’s expected harm (b∗ − be) if physician negligence increases expected treatment
costs (c > c∗) and are less than the patient’s expected harm if physician negligence
41 In the traditional framework, excessive damages can distort behavior if courts err when determining
negligence. See Craswell and Calfee (1986). Our analysis shows the importance of accuracy in assessing
damages even when courts accurately assess liability.
42 To use Professor Robert Cooter’s terminology, negligence liability operates as a “sanction” in its regu-
lation of treatment choice, but operates to “price” physician expertise. See Cooter (1984).
43 Observe that the component of damages targeted to the patient’s harm, (b∗ − be), is based on the
expected ex ante cost of receiving injurious erroneous treatment, and not on the ex post value of the
harm suffered. This damage measure is equivalent to the harm suffered if the patient necessarily would
have recovered fully if provided treatment b∗ and was destined to suffer injury from treatment !t. Damages
are less than the ex post harm suffered, however, if treatment t∗ entailed a risk of injury even if properly
performed (as is the case with any surgery). In this case, damages for medical error should be discounted
for the expected harm the patient could have suffered from nonnegligent care (e.g., the background risk
of death from any surgery).
44 The damage for increased treatment cost is adjusted by the probability that the physician harms the
patient on the assumption that negligent treatment invariably affects expected treatment costs, but this
negligence is actionable only if the treatment injures the patient (which occurs with probability πD).
The use of a multiplier to adjust for the probability that injurious negligence (to the MCO) may not
result in a lawsuit is consistent with Becker (1968), Cooter (1982), and Polinsky and Shavell (1998).
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reduces expected treatment costs (c < c∗). This result illustrates the ambiguous effect
that utilization review can have upon optimal damages. The standard rule is that the
physician reimburses the patient for the harm caused, namely (b∗ − be).45 This result
shows that depending upon the cost structure, the optimal damage may be greater or
less than the standard rule now used in court.
The proposition also shows that if the physician is held liable for her treatment de-
cisions, then the MCO must also be held liable for its negligent treatment decisions
made pursuant to utilization review in order to implement the optimal allocation. To
induce optimal MCO authority, damages for MCO negligence must be based on the
expected direct harm to the patient and the physician of the patient receiving inju-
rious treatment from the MCO instead of the expected benefit of physician-selected
treatment. As physician-selected treatment includes a risk of error, optimal damages
thus equal the cost to the patient and the physician of the patient receiving injurious
treatment instead of nonnegligent treatment (1 + α) (b∗ − be) , adjusted to reflect the
probability-weighted expected cost to them of injurious physician error:
(1 + α)
(1− e∗)πD (b∗ − be)
πI
.
Thus, in general, the MCO should face damages that are less than the harm caused by
providing injurious treatment instead of nonnegligent treatment.
Cost-Sharing Contracts
In practice, the MCO is not limited to the use of authority to affect physician
decision-making. The MCO also can make physician reimbursement dependent upon
treatment costs. For example, the MCO may pay the physician a lump sum for each
patient, but only reimburse her for a portion of the cost of any treatment provided. In
this section we briefly consider the effect of cost-sharing on optimal damage rules.
Initially, suppose that the treatment decision does not depend upon the cost-sharing
rule. That is, the informed physician is assumed to choose the treatment that is in the
best ex post interests of the patient. Let the amount of cost sharing be represented by
the parameter β ∈ [0, 1] , where the MCO reimburses (1− β) fraction of the costs, and
the physician pays the rest. A straightforward extension of proposition 2 implies the
following corollary:
Corollary 3 When the physician pays a fraction β of the costs of treatment, then,
assuming the negligence rule constrains an informed physician to select treatment t∗,
45 Observe that the costs cˆ and c∗ are paid by the MCO at the time service is provided. Hence, it
would not normally be part of the award. Costs of further treatment and maintanance not paid by the
MCO would be part of a tort award, and would be included in the calculation of be.
24
the optimal damage rules are:




L¯I = (1 + α)
½
(b∗ − be)− (1− e




c0 − (e∗c∗ + (1− e∗)c)¢
πI
)
where e∗ is the optimal level of expertise.
Observe that as the share of costs borne by the physician increases, this moves
the optimal liability rule in the direction of the current law. In the extreme case in
which the physician bears all treatment costs, liability is simply (b∗ − be) , the harm
to the patient due to negligent treatment. Under our maintained hypothesis that MCO
treatment costs are lower, this unambiguously decreases optimal MCO liability relative
to no cost sharing.
The Effect upon Treatment Decision
Cost-sharing not only affects authority and expertise, it also alters the physician’s
treatment decision. Though cost-sharing is often lauded as a way to improve physician
treatment decisions, in fact it does not necessarily do so. When the MCO fully in-
sures the patient and the physician against costs, an informed physician selects overly
expensive treatments because she only considers the ex post benefit from treatment,
and ignores treatment costs: t∗ = argmaxαbt. When there is cost sharing, ex post the
physician’s benefit from a treatment decision is αbt−βct.Accordingly, absent liability,
cost sharing will induce an informed physician to select the treatment:








Cost-sharing can induce the physician to select the optimal treatment:
t∗∗ = argmax
t∈T
(1 + α) bt − ct,
by setting β = α(1+α) < 1. Under full capitation β = 1, in which case one has
suboptimal treatment quality, absent liability since bt(1) < b∗. Notice that when α is
small, then one needs only a small amount of cost sharing to induce optimal treatment
choice. However, given that α is likely to vary greatly from physician to physician
it is difficult, if not impossible, for the the MCO to choose an optimal cost sharing
parameter.
This implies that when physicians are subject to cost-sharing, negligence may play
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a dual role, regulating not only expertise but also treatment choice. If β is moderately
large, then negligence liability is needed to ensure that informed physicians do not
provide suboptimal care in an effort to cut costs. In this case, the negligence standard
is more likely to place a binding constraint on the physician’s treatment choice.
In conclusion, the use of cost sharing can, in principle, result in the physician mak-
ing a more efficient decision, but it can do so reliably only if accompanied by negli-
gence liability for negligent treatment outcomes. Indeed, the use of cost sharing fur-
ther increases the importance of the tort system to ensure quality treatment. For those
physicians who place a lower weight α upon good outcomes, the negligence standard
in effect defines the standard of care provided by these physicians when they are in-
formed.
5. Optimal Damages with Performance Pay and Entity Liability
The present section expands the previous analysis of individual liability to consider
optimal negligence liability where the MCO and physician can contractually agree that,
if either is negligent, the negligent provider must make payments to the other. The
section compares optimal damage awards under such a regime with optimal damages
where such contracts are not possible. We also consider whether welfare would be im-
proved by holding the MCO, rather than the physician, liable for physician negligence.
The existing rule of vicarious liability only holds a Principal liable for its Agent’s
negligence if the Principal employs the Agent; Principals generally are not liable for
torts committed by independent contractors. Most MCO contracts are structured so
that affiliated-physicians are independent contractors, and hence MCOs often avoid
liability for physician negligence even when physicians are insolvent (and unable to
pay optimal damages). We capture the independent-contractor nature of the physician
relationship by assuming that the MCO cannot observe the physician’s behavior, and
thus cannot directly control physician care-taking.
Performance Pay
Consider the situation where the MCO is liable for its own treatment decisions,
and either the MCO or the physician may be liable for physician negligence, with the
physician liable under “individual” liability and the MCO liable under “entity-level”
liability. Assume further that the MCO can sanction the physician whenever she would
be found negligent in court, and, in turn, that the physician can sanction the MCO for
negligence.46
To model this, suppose that the MCO bears a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of the physician’s
liability, with γ = 1 corresponding to the case of entity-level liability (EL for short)
46 This does not necessarily entail a court decision. Some cases may decided without the plaintiff ever
going to court, either through settlement or arbitration. In that case, the MCO may still penalize the
physician should it (or the arbitrator) determine the physician was negligent.
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and γ = 0 corresponding to individual liability (IL for short). In this case the liability
of the MCO and the physician are:
LI = aπILI + γ (1− a) (1− e)πDLD, (18)
LD = (1− γ) (1− a) (1− e)πDLD, (19)
whereLI are damages awarded for harms caused by MCO negligence andLD are dam-
ages for harm caused by physician negligence. For simplicity, the explicit dependence
of Lt on a,e,LI ,LD, and γ is suppressed.
The sequence of decisions in the relationship is as follows:
1. The patient offers a contract to the MCO that entails a payment P, and damage rules,
LI and LD. The MCO can either accept the contract or reject it and obtain 0. The
MCO reimburses γ of the physician’s liability.
2. The MCO then offers a contract to the physician, given the damage rules, the con-
tract terms for a wage, W, and penalties kI and kD, depending upon who selected
the treatment. The penalties kI and kD depend upon the same conditions that trig-
ger a court case, and hence they are substitutes for LI and LD, with the difference
that the payments go to the MCO and not to the patient.
3. The MCO and the physician simultaneously set authority and expertise.
4. The patient falls ill and receives treatment from the physician.
As before, it is assumed that the contract terms between the physician and the MCO
are agreed upon after the patient has purchased insurance. This is consistent with the
observation that the MCO has no obligation to inform the patient of any changes in
the terms of the contract with the physician. The purpose of the sanction kD is to
provide the MCO with control over the actions of the physician. The optimal contract
is therefore the solution to the following constrained optimization problem:
max
P,W,LD,LI ,a,e
I − P + {B (a, e) +LI + LD} (20)
subject to the MCO’s participation constraint:
P −W + aπIkI −LI + (1− a)(1− e)πDkD −C (a, e)− VI (a) ≥ 0,
and the MCO’s incentive constraint:
W,a, e, kI , kD ∈ arg max
W,a,e,kI ,kD
 P −W + aπIkI − LI + (1− a)(1− e)πDkD−C (a, e)− VI (a)
 .
The MCO in turn must offer a contract that satisfies the physician’s participation con-
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straint :  W + αB (a, e)− aπIkI − (1− a)(1− e)πD−kD − LD − VD (e) /θ
 ≥ U0D.
Finally, the fact that the contract is incomplete implies that the MCO and the physician
choose optimal investments ex post:
a ∈ arg max
a0∈[0,1]
 P −W + a0πIkI −LI + (1− a0)(1− e)πDkD−C (a0, e)− VI (a0)}
 ,
e ∈ arg max
e0∈[0,1]
 αB (a, e0)− aπIkI − (1− a)(1− e0)πDkD−LD − VD (e0) /θ
 .
The MCO’s ability to employ performance pay fundamentally changes the role of
the tort system. In the previous section, where performance pay was not available, tort
damages lay where they fell. Thus tort liability has to ensure that, post-contract, the
MCO and the physician each have optimal incentives. By contrast, when the MCO
employs performance pay it is the MCO that determines post-contractual incentives to
invest in expertise and assert authority. Accordingly, the role of the tort system shifts
from providing optimal ex post incentives to ensuring that, ex ante, MCO profits are
maximized when expertise and authority are both efficient. These ex ante incentives
induce the MCO to design performance contracts that in turn induce both the physician
and itself to behave efficiently post-contract.
Solvent Physicians
When physicians are solvent with respect to optimal damages, the allocation of
liability between the MCO and the physician does not affect either expected liability or
MCO incentives. The MCO bears the full cost of its own liability directly, and bears the
cost of any liability imposed on the physician through its obligation to pay the physician
a sufficiently large wage to ensure that being affiliated with the MCO always is as good
as her next best market alternative. Thus, the MCO bears the same expected liability
for physician negligence, whether it is imposed directly – in the form of entity-level
liability – or indirectly, through the effect of individual liability on physician wages.
Thus, we get the following neutrality result:
Proposition 4 (Neutrality)When performance pay is possible, then the distribution of
liability between the physician and the MCO does not affect authority nor expertise,
regardless of the damage award.
This result follows from Proposition 5 below, and so the proof is omitted. It extends
the earlier results of the Kornhauser (1982) and Sykes (1984) for a standard Principal-
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Agent model to the case of an authority relationship.47 Performance contracts allow
the MCO to internalize all the costs and benefits of medical care to both itself and the
physician. Thus, tort liability need only ensure that the MCO internalizes the benefit
of treatment to the patient; liability no longer need ensure that each provider bears
the cost of her negligence to the other. Once the MCO has incentives to induce e∗
and a∗, the MCO will ensure that each provider has the appropriate ex post incentives
through private sanctions kI and kD. The exact form that damages take depends upon
the allocation of liability between the MCO and the physician as follows:
Proposition 5 When a∗ > 0 then, under either EL or IL, optimal expected damage
rules are:
LD∗ = (b∗ − be) ,
LI∗ = (b∗ − be) ,



















The proof of this result is in the Appendix.
With performance contracts, optimal liability for physician negligence simply equals
the realized harm to the patient, b∗ − be. The MCO employs a private sanction kD to
ensure that the physician also considers the cost of her negligence to the MCO. Thus,





regardless of whether one has individual or enterprise-level liability.
Similarly, optimal damages for MCO negligence are based only on the patient’s ex-
pected losses. They no longer must include the cost to the physician of MCO authority
because the MCO bears the cost ex ante through physician wages, and can provide
optimal ex post incentives to take physician welfare into account through kI . Whereas
absent incentive contracts, the court would need to adjust liability for MCO negligence
by a term to reflect the probability (e) and cost of physician error (see Equation 17),
performance contracts simplify the task of computing court- imposed damages. This
leaves the task of estimating expected physician expertise to the MCO.
Thus, the present analysis suggests that courts and legislatures should not interfere
with the MCO and physician performance-pay contracts, providing both MCOs and
physicians are subject to optimal negligence liability.48
47 Zeiler (2004) shows that neutrality with repect to the liablity regime holds in the context of a game with
information disclosure.
48 Efforts abound to limit the ability to MCOs to obtain indemnification from negligent physicians and
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Judgment Proof Physicians
The purpose of this section is to explore the extent to which enterprise liability is
optimal in the independent-contractor context when the Agent’s assets are not sufficient
to cover optimal damages and when the Principal can alter care by regulating the scope
of the agency relationship.
For simplicity’s sake suppose that the wealth constraint is given by W, the physi-
cian’s income. This assumption is made for notational simplicity only; the more gen-
eral case yields the same results. Accordingly, the payoff to the physician is given
by:
Uα (a, e,C) =W−aπIkI−(1− a) (1− e)πDmin
©
kD + (1− γ)LD,W
ª−VD (e) /θ,




W − (1− γ)LDª .
The wealth constraint implies that it is not possible to fully control the physician via
monetary sanctions. This constraint can be relaxed by moving liability from the physi-
cian to the MCO, who would then fully internalize the effects of authority and expertise
on patient outcomes. When the wealth constraint is binding, this can result in a Pareto
improvement.
Proposition 6 Suppose damages are set equal to harm:
LD∗ = (b∗ − be) , (21)
LI∗ = (b∗ − be) . (22)
Then, if the MCO can contract with the physician using the same information as the
courts, the rule of entity liability implements the optimal allocation given the physi-
cian’s wealth constraint, and is strictly preferred to individual liability when this con-
straint is binding.
Proof. The liability rules (21) and (22) imply that the MCO’s liability for negligence
is L(a, e, LI∗, LD∗) = B (a, e)+ constant. Hence, the proof of proposition 5 implies
ΠEL = (1 + α)B (a, e) − C (a, e) − VI (a) + /− constant. Therefore the MCO
has exactly the same objective function as the patient, and hence the MCO chooses a
contract that maximizes patient welfare, subject to the physician’s IR constraint and the
IC constraints for the MCO and the physician, as given by the appropriately modified
participation and incentives constraints for the optimization problem 20. Given that
to shift liability for MCO negligence. The present analysis demonstrates the value of permitting such
contracts.
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the set of contracts offered by the MCO include all possible liability regimes that the
court can impose as a special case, this implies that the optimal allocation subject to
the physician’s wealth constraint is implemented.
If the physician’s wealth constraint is binding under individual liability, then W <
b∗ − b, and one has ∂ΠIL/∂e = αBe (a, e) + (1 − a)W − Ce < ∂ΠEL/∂e = (1 +
α)Be (a, e)− Ce. Since the constraints are continuous and differentiable in expertise,
it follows that entity-level liability is superior to individual liability.
This result demonstrates that entity-level liability, when damages are equal to harm,
can always ensure the second-best optimum. This does not imply that there does not
exist some individual liability rule that implements the second-best, only that such a lia-
bility rule would have to be a function of parameters characterizing the MCO-physician
relationship, including the level of physician wealth, as we demonstrate in proposition
2. The point is that the MCO affects the quality of medical care via the use of utilization
reviews ex post, and through the use of cost-sharing contracts with the physician. By
moving all liability to the MCO, the courts need only ensure that the MCO internalizes
the consequences of its decisions upon patient outcomes, as measured by b∗ − be. The
case for MCO liability is further strengthened if we suppose that they have superior
information regarding physician performance.
MCO Has Superior Information
Insolvency presents a problem because in serious, permanent injury cases b∗ − be
is very large and is likely to exceed the physician’s wealth. Thus the physician’s insol-
vency insulates her from the full cost of her error. The MCO may have the capacity
to impose expected sanctions on physicians equal to the full cost of physician error if
the MCO can increase the probability that a negligent physician is sanctioned (thereby
reducing the magnitude of the optimal sanction). While a court only learns about physi-
cian negligence through the victim’s lawsuit, the MCO may be able to detect (and sanc-
tion) physician negligence even when the patient does not sue, and thereby increase the
probability of sanction. For example, in our model physician error yields an expected
harm of only (b∗ − b), but optimal damages must be set at the cost of injurious error
(at b∗ − be which is larger than b∗ − b) because courts only sanction physicians if the
patient is injured. An MCO able to detect all physician negligence – i.e., all instances
when treatment costs equal bc – could reduce the insolvency problem by imposing a
sanction for expected patient losses of b∗ − b for each instance of negligence, even if
the the patient suffered no lasting injury. Through these reduced, but more frequent,
sanctions, the MCO could provide the physician with the requisite ex ante incentives
to take care with a much lower actual damage award, thereby reducing the likelihood
that the physician is judgment proof.
Entity-level liability provides the MCO with the optimal incentive to use its infor-
mation to reduce the problem of physician insolvency because this regime ensures that
the MCO maximizes its profits by inducing optimal expertise and authority. Individual
liability does not provide the MCO with an incentive to employ this alternative sanc-
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tion regime, because reducing physician insolvency only increases its own expected
costs: the greater the physician’s own expected liability, the greater the MCO’s wage
obligation to the physician.
To explore this, suppose that the courts impose a penalty only when physician neg-
ligence injures the patient – which occurs with probability (1− a) (1− e)πD– but
that the MCO can sanction the physician whenever the physician is negligent, which
occurs with probability (1− a) (1− e). Hence, if the courts impose a sanction LD
upon the physician, then the MCO can achieve the same deterrence with a sanction
of kD = πDLD < LD, and hence the MCO faces a less- binding wealth constraint.
Therefore, we may conclude:
Proposition 7 Suppose that the MCO can observe whenever the physician makes an
uninformed decision, then if α is sufficiently small, and physician expertise is suffi-









+ (c− c∗) , where W ∗ is the optimal wage, then entity-
level liability results in the first-best, while individual liability is inefficient.
This result captures the basic reason why vicarious liability is the preferred rule
when the Principal has better information than the courts on ex post outcomes, and
thus can modify dangerous or inefficient behavior on the part of the Agent, even if it
does not result in a tort action.49 This result is consistent with Sykes (1984), who finds
that entity-level liability can improve care if damages may be large or small because
the entity can impose excess damages in small cases, and thereby increase incentives
to take care. Our results extend this insight to the situation where third parties sue
whenever they are injured, but where negligence does not always injure the third party.
6. Discussion
Current law treats physicians who provide services for MCOs as independent con-
tractors and hence MCOs are shielded from torts arising from physician negligence.
An important feature of MCO contracts is the right to overrule physician decisions
and thus to deny the patient coverage for some treatments via a system of utilization
review. Dranove and Spier (2003) show that utilization review, especially when the
MCO can commit itself to a review strategy, can enhance efficiency through the appro-
priate screening of cases. Using the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997), we illustrate
that utilization review can also lower the incentives for physicians to acquire expertise.
This creates a trade-off between the cost reducing effects of an increase in the exercise
of authority by the MCO, and the negative consequences for a physician’s incentive to
49 The proof is similar to the previous proposition and hence is omitted.
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acquire expertise.
In the context of this model, utilization review unambiguously reduces the quality
of health care, a result that is consistent with the empirical findings of Duggan (2002)
and Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2004).50 However, there are situations under which
the cost savings can outweigh the impact upon outcomes, and hence it is efficient to
have such a system. When the levels of authority and expertise are not contractible
and the MCOs are shielded from tort liability, as is currently the law, then the market
equilibrium is not efficient. We have provided two scenarios under which tort law can
be modified to ensure efficiency.
If the MCO implements only a system of utilization review, and does not otherwise
regulate the behavior of physicians, then efficiency can be restored if MCOs are held
liable for torts arising from the system of utilization review. The optimal damages in
this case differ from the standard damages under a negligence and depend upon the
costs of services, as well as the likelihood that a negligent decision is detected.
If the MCO writes a contract with physicians that is conditional upon their perfor-
mance and the costs that they incur, then holding the MCO liable for all torts and using
patient’s harm as the basis for the computation of damages results in an efficient alloca-
tion. In some cases this allocation is strictly superior to a system with individual-level
liability.
Even though our model highlights the potentially adverse consequences of utiliza-
tion review, it is still the case that the efficient allocation may entail some denial of
treatment. In practice, as Aizer, Currie, and Moretti (2004) discuss, the introduction
of MCOs may have other beneficial effects. For example, if they are required to cover
a patient for a long period of time, then they have an incentive to invest in preventive
care to lower future costs. Moreover, they are in a position to collect information re-
garding the consequences of different treatments from a large population. Potentially,
this puts them in a position to make better decisions than individual physicians, whose
experience is derived from a much smaller sample of patients. More generally, MCOs
are in the unique position of being able to coordinate the many providers that a modern
health care system might use to treat a difficult (and expensive) medical case. This
in turn suggests that future research should fully explore the possibility of changing
current tort law toward allocating responsibility to a single actor, such as the managed
care organization.
50 Duggan (2002) also finds that the introduction of an MCO does not appear to lower costs, while
Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2004) provide evidence that physicians can make decisions that reduce
expenditures. These empirical findings are consistent with our model and suggest that the cost saving from
less treatment may be outweighed by the fixed costs of setting up the monitoring of treatment decisions.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2: Given that the payoff function for each agent is continuous,
and quasiconcave in the agent’s own strategy, and the strategy space is compact and
convex, implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium. The compactness of the con-
straints ensures the existence of a solution. The fact that −Ca (e) , αBe (a) > 0 for
a, e ∈ [0, 1), combined with the maintained assumptions on VD (a) and VI (e) , ensures
that both strategies are positive.
Inequality 2 follows from the fact that at the equilibrium one has:
SWe (a
c, ec) = (1 + α)Be (a
c, ec)−Ce (ac, ec)− V 0D (ec) /θD
= Be (a





+ c∗ − c
i
> 0.
In the case of authority, one has:
SWa (a
c, ec) = (1 + α)Ba (a
c, ec)−Ca (ac, ec)− V 0I (ac)
= (1 + α)Ba (a
c, ec)
= (1 + α) [b0 − {eb∗ + (1− e)bb}]
from which the final inequality follows.
Proof of Proposition 3: Under the negligence rule, the physician’s behavior, given





/θ = αBe (a, e) + (1− a)πDLD,














= V 0D (e) /θ
Since VD is convex, physician expertise is uniquely identified from this expression,














πDLD = (b∗ − b) + (c− c∗) .
and, therefore, given bb = πDbe + (1− πD)b∗:
LD = (b∗ − be) + (c− c
∗)
πD
In the case of the MCO, the first-order conditions the damages must satisfy are given
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by:
SWa (a, e) = −Ca (a, e)− πILI − V 0I (a) ,
(1 + α)Ba (a, e)−Ca (a, e)− V 0I (a) = −Ca (a, e)− πILI − V 0I (a) ,
(1 + α)Ba (a, e) = −πILI .
This implies expression 17.
Proof of Proposition 6: Notice that the incentive constraints for the MCO and the
physician are concave programs, and hence described by their first-order conditions.
Hence, the Lagrangian for the MCO’s problem, given the damage rules, is given by:




αB (a, e)− LD − aπIkI − (1− a)(1− e)πDkD
ª








αBe (a, e) + ∂LD/∂e+ (1− a)πDkD − V 0D (e) /θ
ª
,
where λ is the multiplier for the physician’s IR constraint, µI is the multiplier for
the MCO’s IC constraint, and µD is the corresponding multiplier for the physician’s IC
constraint.
The first-order condition ∂L/∂W = 0 implies that λ = 1, hence the Lagrangian is
now:
L = P + αB (a, e)−C (a, e)− (LD + LI)− VI (a)− VD (e) /θ − U0D
+µI
©




αBe (a, e) + ∂LD/∂e+ (1− a)πDkD − V 0D (e) /θ
ª
Now notice that 0 = ∂L/∂kD = µI(1− a)πD, and since a < 1, then this implies that
µI = 0. Similarly, µD = 0. Therefore, the incentive constraints are not binding. That
is, the MCO can select, at no cost, the level of kI and kD to control the desired level of
authority and expertise ex ante. Consequently, the MCO chooses a and e to satisfy:
αBa (a, e)−Ca (a, e)− ∂ (LD + LI) /∂a− V 0I (a) = 0, (A-1)
αBe (a, e)−Ce (a, e)− ∂ (LD + LI) /∂e− V 0D (e) /θ = 0. (A-2)
Observe that LD + LI = aπILI + (1− a) (1− e)πDLD, hence demonstrating the
first claim, namely that the MCO’s decision is independent of γ.
Now the patient’s problem is to solve:
max
P,W,LI ,LD,a,e
I − P + ©B (a, e) + (1− a)(1− e)πDLD + aπILIª ,
subject to the individual rationality and incentive constraints. Substituting in for W
and P, using the individual rationality constraints, one arrives at the problem:
max
P,W,LI ,LD,a,e
I + (1 + α)B (a, e)−C (a, e) ,
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subject to A-1 and A-2. Since LD and LI no longer enter the objective function, then
they are selected such that:
−∂ (LD + LI) /∂a = −πILI + (1− e)πDLD = Ba (a∗, e∗) ,
−∂ (LD + LI) /∂e = (1− a)πDLD = Be (a∗, e∗) ,
which implies the optimal-damage rules.
The IC constraints can be used to derive kI and kD, which must solve:
πIkI − (1− e)πDkD − ∂LI/∂a−Ca (a, e) = (1 + α)Ba −Ca
αBe + (1− a)πDkD − ∂LD/∂e = (1 + α)Be −Ce,
from which one obtains the expressions in the proposition.
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